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Abstract
Many human cultural traits become increasingly beneficial as they are repeatedly transmitted,
thanks to an accumulation of modifications made by successive generations. But how do later gener-
ations typically avoid modifications which revert traits to less beneficial forms already sampled and
rejected by earlier generations? And how can later generations do so without direct exposure to their
predecessors’ behavior? One possibility is that learners are sensitive to cues of non-random produc-
tion in others’ behavior, and that particular variants (e.g., those containing structural regularities
unlikely to occur spontaneously) have been produced deliberately and with some effort. If this non-
random behavior is attributed to an informed strategy, then the learner may infer that apparent avoid-
ance of certain possibilities indicates that these have already been sampled and rejected. This could
potentially prevent performance plateaus resulting from learners modifying inherited behaviors ran-
domly. We test this hypothesis in four experiments in which participants, either individually or in
interacting dyads, attempt to locate rewards in a search grid, guided by partial information about
another individual’s experience of the task. We find that in some contexts, valid inferences about
another’s behavior can be made from partial information, and these inferences can be used in a way
which facilitates trait adaptation. However, the benefit of these inferences appears to be limited, and
in many contexts—including some which have the potential to make inferring the experience of
another individual easier—there appears to be no benefit at all. We suggest that inferring previous
behavior from partial social information plays a minimal role in the adaptation of cultural traits.
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1. Introduction
Many cultural traits, such as those involved in preparing food, locating resources,
determining causal relationships, or even designing scientific experiments, are fundamen-
tally “search tasks,” in that they involve searching for and selecting behaviors from a vast
number of possible options, in search of behaviors which result in desirable outcomes.
For these tasks, users have to balance the benefits of exploiting familiar actions for
known rewards with exploring novel actions with unknown payoffs (Hills, Todd, Lazer,
Redish, & Couzin, 2015; Wu, Schulz, Speekenbrink, Nelson, & Meder, 2018). Human
culture is unique in that many such traits, with repeated transmission from individual to
individual and generation to generation, change in ways that make them increasingly ben-
eficial to their users. As a result of this, later generations are able to exploit some inven-
tions and behaviors that might also have been preferred by their predecessors, but which
were not used simply because they had not yet been discovered. Thus, benefits of experi-
ence appear to accrue over successive generations within human populations such that it
is possible for individuals to exploit traits discovered as a consequence of others’ cumula-
tive exploration efforts (e.g., Henrich & McElreath, 2003; Tennie, Call, & Tomasello,
2009; Tomasello, 1999).
By contrast, there is little evidence of this occurring in cases of social transmission in
other animals, including species recognized to be capable of imitative learning, and those
exhibiting population-specific behavioral traditions in natural environments (e.g., Dean,
Vale, Laland, Flynn, & Kendal, 2014; Tennie et al., 2009; though see, e.g., Caldwell
et al., 2020; Laland & Hoppitt, 2003; Mesoudi & Thornton, 2018; Schofield, McGrew,
Takahashi, & Hirata, 2018, for further discussion regarding the lack of evidence for
cumulative culture in non-humans). However, in many respects, it is the human anomaly
of accumulating benefits that requires explanation, more so than its apparent absence in
other species. To appreciate this point, consider that each generation can be regarded as
being exposed to a broadly equivalent “snapshot” of information about the behavior of
others. That snapshot is limited by individual lifespans, the availability of potential
demonstrators, and that the amount of effort devoted to the development of one’s own
skill is necessarily limited, even if only by the fact that it can only realistically increase
at the expense of other potentially valuable opportunities for exploration or exploitation.
However, in spite of the window of opportunity being bounded and relatively constant,
benefits from that learning apparently continue to accrue. This suggests that the social
information to which later generations are exposed is in itself more valuable to potential
learners, relative to equivalent social information which would have been available from
observation of members of earlier generations.
Although we are inclined to take it for granted on account of its very ubiquity, this
phenomenon of increasingly beneficial traits arising through social transmission—usually
referred to as cumulative cultural evolution (e.g., Boyd & Richerson, 1996; Mesoudi &
Thornton, 2018; Tomasello, 1999)—is therefore highly remarkable. Human cumulative
culture is sometimes explained as a consequence of high-fidelity transmission of traits
(e.g., Dean et al., 2014; Lewis & Laland, 2012), and certainly this must be part of the
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story. However, even if traits are transmitted with relatively high fidelity, how is it that,
in refining and modifying observed behaviors, newcomers typically avoid producing
behaviors that have been abandoned in earlier generations upon discovery of more prof-
itable alternatives? Avoiding adopting such behaviors is necessary for traits to typically
become increasingly beneficial to the user, and such avoidance appears to occur in spite
of the fact that learners have had no direct or indirect exposure to these earlier behaviors
(and therefore often have no knowledge of the relative payoffs involved). This is particu-
larly noteworthy given that cumulative cultural evolution is expected to generate traits
which would be increasingly improbable as individual discoveries (i.e., that an individual
would be increasingly unlikely to discover without social information). Therefore, errors
of transmission would typically be expected to operate in the opposite direction, creating
pressure for simplification and reproducibility. What then can account for the preserva-
tion, and even continued improvement, of behaviors which would be unlikely to be pro-
duced spontaneously, without much apparent “backwards slippage” (e.g., Tennie et al.,
2009) reducing benefits to the user? How, for example, are technological tools altered in
ways which increase their efficiency when a learner does not have access to a historical
record of earlier devices and their payoffs? Or how does a researcher discover a more
optimal solution to a problem than one they observe in light of the “file-drawer prob-
lem,” resulting in their not having access to alternative solutions already found by other
researchers to be in some way inferior?
One possibility, which we explore here, is that learners can detect systematic regulari-
ties in others’ behavior, recognize that they have been produced deliberately and with
some effort, and use them to generalize beyond the behavior they observe. Humans are
sensitive to structural regularities in received information in a variety of modalities (as
evidenced by the statistical learning literature; see, e.g., Fiser & Aslin, 2001; Frank,
Tenenbaum, & Gibson, 2013; Frost, Armstrong, & Christiansen, 2019; Saffran & Kirk-
ham, 2018), and so if non-random behavior is attributed to an informed strategy on the
part of a demonstrator, then the learner might be able to infer that apparent avoidance of
certain behavioral variants may mean that these have already been sampled and rejected,
either by that demonstrator themselves or by one of their (cultural) predecessors. It is
easy to see that such an ability might potentially facilitate the process whereby newcom-
ers can apparently pick up a search where their predecessors left off, with some protec-
tion against backwards slippage. This could potentially prevent, or at least delay,
performance plateaus that might otherwise be expected if learners simply modified
socially inherited behaviors through random search strategies which treated all possible
unknowns as equally worthy of personal exploration.
Such a mechanism could be useful for many types of cultural trait, but it could be par-
ticularly important for traits with certain characteristics. This would include those which
leave no lasting physical record from which a learner could determine the behaviors of
many or all previous generations. It will also apply to traits which are opaque, in that the
function or effects of particular aspects of a behavior are difficult or impossible to deter-
mine. This may be the case for certain manufacturing processes, complex technologies,
meal preparations, or the tying of complex knots, to give a few examples, where a
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behavior may involve the learner completing a number of non-intuitive sub-goals. Alter-
natively, or additionally, this mechanism may be particularly useful for traits for which it
is difficult or impossible to predict the payoffs which may be received from adopting a
particular behavior, which may be the case when adopting a foraging strategy in an envi-
ronment which offers little explicit indications of where desirable resources may be
located. However, even if this mechanism could be especially useful in these cases, it
could still benefit other types of cumulative cultural trait as well. For example, a learner
could save having to examine a (possibly prohibitively vast) physical record, or avoid
making (possibly very numerous) calculations or predictions about the payoffs a particu-
lar behavior could receive, even where it would be theoretically possible to do so.
If such inferences do turn out to allow learners to make significantly more effective
use of social information in ways that could allow them to overcome performance pla-
teaus, then this could also explain why this phenomenon does not tend to be observed in
other species. As detailed above, learners would need to make and use inferences about
others’ experience or knowledge, to avoid wasting potentially valuable search time
exploring options that have already been investigated and rejected in prior generations.
And in spite of recent evidence of great apes predicting others’ behavior on the basis of
those agents’ beliefs (Kano, Krupenye, Hirata, Tomonaga, & Call, 2019; Krupenye, Kano,
Hirata, Call, & Tomasello, 2016), such understanding appears to be “implicit,” that is, it
is not believed to be accessible for use in other contexts. Such a capacity therefore would
function only to generate expectations about others’ likely behavior, and it could not be
used to inform one’s own behavioral decisions outside of the context of immediate inter-
action with that particular individual.
Here, we investigated the role of inferring previous behaviors in the cultural transmis-
sion of search tasks, in line with established methodologies used to study the evolution of
cultural traits in controlled conditions (see Caldwell et al., 2020; Caldwell, Atkinson, &
Renner, 2016, for a review). We used a variant of a search task paradigm we have
employed previously in the study of the mechanisms of cumulative cultural evolution in
adults (Atkinson et al., submitted; Mackintosh et al., in prep.), children (Wilks et al., in
prep.; Wilks et al., submitted), and non-human primates. Modeling the naturalistic process
of cultural transmission, our experimental design focused on the actions, and those
actions’ effects on a transmitted behavior, of an individual learner (an “Observer”), who
is exposed to some information about the behavior of another (a “Demonstrator”), and
then acquires and modifies that behavior. We used human participants as Demonstrators
so as to obtain social information which exhibited naturalistic variation, as opposed to
constructing the social information ourselves. In a task similar to a game of “battleships,”
the Demonstrators searched a grid of tiles with the aim of maximizing the payoffs gener-
ated by their selections. They did so by selecting tiles that increased task score (“hits”),
and avoiding those that used up search opportunities without increasing the score
(“misses”). They were given multiple attempts at the task to allow them to develop
increasingly beneficial behaviors as a result of their own trial-and-error learning. We
anticipated (correctly) that these ordered variants of the behaviors would therefore possess
one of the key features of cumulative cultural traits: They would improve, in the sense
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that the payoffs to the user (here, their task score) increased, with earlier behavioral vari-
ants being abandoned in favor of those leading to higher payoffs. The Observers, who
were given the same task as the Demonstrators of achieving as high a score as possible
by selecting hits and avoiding misses, were only provided with the final variant(s) of the
behavior. They therefore had social information which they could benefit from when
adopting and modifying the observed behavior, but they were not explicitly provided with
the full history of the trait (i.e., information of all the variants sampled and rejected by a
Demonstrator). To allow our investigation to focus on whether the Observers made and
used valid information about the Demonstrator’s behavior that they were not explicitly
provided with, we made using the explicitly provided social information as trivial as pos-
sible. The social information remained visible for inspection while the Observer was
making their selections, and the hits and misses of the social information were clearly
marked. The Observer therefore had no memory constraints to contend with when using
the social information, and the relationship between elements of the behavior and their
contribution to the overall payoff was completely transparent. Over four experiments,
each considering a different context of task completion and transmission of social infor-
mation, we investigated whether Observers would (a) infer behavior from partial social
information of a Demonstrator’s experience of a task (i.e., determine behavior over and
above the partial social information they were directly exposed to) and (b) use those
inferences to facilitate their own performance on the task. If they did, then this would
suggest that such a mechanism could, at least in principle, play a role in cumulative cul-
tural evolution. Further work would then of course still be necessary to confirm that it
played a role beyond a single step of cultural transmission, as well as establishing the
extent to which this mechanism plays a role in more naturalistic contexts.
In Experiment 1, we gave participants (the Observers) only limited partial information
about another’s experience of a problem and found no evidence that they made and used
valid inferences about the other person’s behavior from that information. In Experiment
2, we aimed to assess whether participants would carry out the inferential step in a con-
text in which we believed it would be easier for them to do so. We adapted Experiment
1 so that the information received by the participants was more likely to contain transpar-
ent structural regularities from which further information about another’s behavior could
be inferred while also increasing the overall amount of information transmitted. In this
second context, we found that participants did make and use valid inferences about
another’s behavior. The benefit received from those inferences, however, was marginal,
with many participants showing no evidence of having made any inferences at all. In
Experiments 3 and 4, we explored two further contexts which had the potential for reduc-
ing the challenge of making and using valid inferences of another’s behavior. Experiment
3 involved a differently structured reward space in which previous participants were
likely to have behaved in more predictable ways, and Experiment 4 involved dyadic
interaction and so offered the potential for participants to coordinate their search strate-
gies. Despite the greater potential for individuals to behave in more predictable and struc-
turally transparent ways in each of these experiments, however, we found no evidence
that the participants made and used valid inferences of another’s behavior. We end with a
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discussion of the implications of the results of all four experiments for the cultural trans-
mission of adaptive traits.
2. Experiment 1: Exposure to minimal partial information
We assessed the ability for participants (Observers) to make and use valid inferences
about others’ past experience of a problem from exposure to partial information about
their behavior. In this case, this partial information was a single attempt at a problem
made by another participant (a Demonstrator).
For consistency and ease of comparison with Experiments 2–4 which follow, below
we present the methodology and results for this experiment referring only to a single
Observer condition. However, we also collected data for a second Observer condition
which can be compared with the one we report here, and it was the approach with both
Observer conditions that we preregistered with the Open Science Framework prior to data
collection: https://osf.io/9heqv. The second Observer condition was essentially a control
condition, in which no structural information about the Demonstrator’s search strategy
was available, and so it was not possible for the Observer to make valid inferences about
previous Demonstrator behavior. For completeness, we describe the preregistered version
of this experiment in Supporting Information Section 1, although the additional data and
analyses do not alter the conclusions we reach below.
2.1. Methods
The task closely resembled the popular childhood game of “battleships,” but with a
20 9 20 board and 20 ships of size 1 9 1. More specifically, all participants were given
the goal of maximizing the payoffs generated through their search of a grid, by selecting
tiles that increased task score (“hits”), and avoiding those that used up search opportuni-
ties without increasing the score (“misses”). Participants were grouped in pairs: The first
participant of each pair was assigned to the Demonstrator role, and completed the task in
the absence of any social information; the second was assigned to the Observer role, and
completed the task while exposed to part of the behavior of the Demonstrator.
Each participant completed three different search problems, with each problem consist-
ing of searching a grid of 20 9 20 tiles. For each problem, a randomly allocated 20 of
the 400 tiles were designated scoring tiles (i.e., hits), and selecting those added 1 point to
the participant’s score without decreasing the number of search attempts remaining. Note
that the random allocation of the rewards meant that the location of one reward could not
be predicted from any other reward(s). This allowed us to specifically investigate the use
of inferences relating to Demonstrator search strategy, without any confounding factor of
there also being some (potentially inferable) structure in the reward space.
The other 380 tiles were designated as non-scoring (misses), and selecting those did
not increase the task score, but used up a search attempt. Participants (whether Demon-
strators or Observers) had 10 opportunities to search the grid in each problem, and to
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earn as high a score as they could within these 10 “expeditions.” In each of the 10 expe-
ditions, participants had up to 20 “search attempts”: They kept making selections until
they reached their limit of 20 misses (or found all 20 hits). It was therefore possible, if
extremely unlikely, for a participant to make 39 selections (19 misses and 20 hits or 19
hits and 20 misses) in a single expedition. The number of search attempts remaining
within the current expedition was shown on screen, along with the cumulative score for
the entire experiment. When selected, scoring tiles were marked with a green hexagon,
while selected non-scoring tiles were marked with a red circle. Once selected, a tile could
not be selected again within the same expedition. See Fig. 1 panel (i) for screen as
viewed by the participant at the start of an expedition, and panel (ii) for how the experi-
ment could appear part way through an expedition. Note that this example is primarily
intended to illustrate the methodology: Such a transparently systematic search of the grid
was not typical for the majority of the participants.
For each new expedition of a single problem, the scoring tiles remained in the same
positions. However, all tiles returned to their unselected state, so the location of the hits
and misses found by the participant were once again concealed (i.e., at the start of each
expedition, the screen would revert to, e.g., panel (i) in Fig. 1, but with the score at the
top right of the screen recording the participant’s cumulative score at that point). Select-
ing scoring tiles, whether selected in a previous expedition or not, always added 1 point
to the participant’s score without decreasing the number of search attempts remaining. As
the participant did not have direct access to the selections of their previous expeditions,
they were (implicitly) incentivized to search the grid in a systematic, that is, non-random,
way, so as to keep track of which tiles they had selected in previous expeditions and not
re-select tiles previously found to be unrewarded.
After participants completed their 10 expeditions for one problem, they moved on to the
next problem. Participants were given three problems to allow them to potentially benefit
from task experience, in that they had the opportunity to develop their search strategy, or
use entirely different ones, as problem number increased. To make the transition between
different problems more salient, and so stress that the location of the rewarded tiles in one
problem was independent of the location of the rewarded tiles in another, the (unselected)
tiles were colored differently for each problem (white, gray, or black). Participants were also
explicitly informed that one problem had ended and the next was to begin.
As noted above, participants assigned to the Demonstrator role attempted each task
with no prior information about whether any of the tiles were scoring or non-scoring.
Each Demonstrator’s performance was then used to generate the information provided to
a second participant assigned to the Observer role.
Observer participants were told that another participant had taken part in the task, and
that their task was the same, that is, that they had 10 expeditions for each of the three
problems, and were aiming to get as high a score as possible. Observer participants were
then given full information about the selections that were made by the Demonstrator on
the Demonstrator’s final expedition for each problem. The Demonstrator selections from
that final expedition were marked on the grid. These selections were given one after
another in the order in which they were selected. Scoring tiles were marked with the
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outline of a green hexagon, and non-scoring tiles marked with the outline of a red circle.
This same information about the Demonstrator’s selections (excluding the information
about the order in which they were selected within the expedition) was displayed on the
grid for all 10 of the Observer’s expeditions for that particular problem. See Fig. 1 panel
(iii) for an example of what the task could potentially look like to an Observer at the start
of an expedition (following a particularly transparently systematic Demonstrator search).
Panel (iv) illustrates the Demonstrator expedition which the Observer would be explicitly
informed of (the final Demonstrator expedition for that problem) alongside crosses which
indicate an example of the additional information from the first nine Demonstrator
Fig. 1. Example screenshots from hypothetical participants in Experiment 1. Panel (i): Demonstrator at the
start of an expedition. Panel (ii): Demonstrator partway through an expedition. Panel (iii): Observer at the
start of an expedition. Panel (iv): Observer at the start of an expedition (as in panel (iii)), with additional
crosses illustrating tiles which the Demonstrator had already found to be unrewarded, but which the Observer
received no explicit information about. Above-chance avoidance of these crosses (which were not made visi-
ble to the participant at any point) would suggest that the Observer was able to infer the search behavior of
the Demonstrator (at least to some extent) and avoid “redundant selections”: misses that the Demonstrator
had already selected, even though the Observer did not have direct access to this information. In the example
shown here, the Demonstrator had broadly used a search strategy of searching every other column for undis-
covered hits, in addition to selecting all hits discovered in previous expeditions. Note that such transparently
systematic Demonstrator behavior was not typical for the majority of our participants.
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expeditions which the Observer would not be explicitly informed of (the Observer would
never see any crosses).
The Observer could make use of information they received however they wished. They
were free to select tiles which were indicated as hits, which would always earn a score of 1
point. They were also free to select the tiles indicated as misses, which would always score 0
points, as well as reducing the number of search attempts remaining within the current expedi-
tion. Note that as the locations of all the hits from the Demonstrator’s last expeditions were
marked on screen, it should have been trivial for the Observer to get a higher cumulative score
than the Demonstrator. As noted above, this allowed us to investigate whether Observers
could make and use valid inferences from partial social information without adding a con-
found of, for example, a memory bottleneck which could affect the use of the partial social
information received (we do investigate the role of exposure time and memory bottlenecks on
cultural evolution outcomes using a similar task in Atkinson et al., submitted, however).
See Fig. 2 for an illustration of the relationship between the Demonstrator and Obser-
ver for a given pair for participants. We assumed that the Demonstrators (themselves aso-
cial learners) would have behaved in particular ways in their own completion of the task.
Specifically, we expected that when given a series of opportunities to explore the same
grid, these participants would have developed non-random search strategies which
allowed them to avoid redundancy across their own attempts (i.e., minimizing re-selection
of grid points already identified as a “miss” on a previous attempt). Hence, for partici-
pants placed in the role of Observer, who were exposed to the final search attempt of one
of the Demonstrators, it may have been possible for them to have avoided redundant
selections—selections already made and found to be unrewarded by the Demonstrator—
above the level that would be expected by chance, if they could infer the systematic
approach of their predecessor with some degree of accuracy.
Fig. 2. Illustration of the relationship between Demonstrator and Observer in Experiment 1.
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For participants assigned to the Observer role, we defined a category of selections—
“redundant” selections—to capture those selections which were redundant from the per-
spective of the social inheritance history, that is, non-scoring tiles that were also selected
by the Demonstrator predecessor at some point during the Demonstrator’s expeditions
exploring the same problem, but which the receiver themselves were not directly exposed
to in the social information they received (i.e., they were not selected in the final Demon-
strator expedition). If the Observer managed to perfectly infer the search behavior of the
Demonstrator from the partial social information transmitted to them, then they could
avoid making any redundant selections.
In our analyses, we considered two key variables: For all participants (both Demonstra-
tors and Observers), we assessed the selection of scoring tiles (note that this is equivalent
to assessing participant score for Experiment 1, though cf. Experiments 2–4); for the
Observers, we assessed the selection of redundant tiles.
The experiment was written and run using PsychoPy 1.84.2 (Peirce et al., 2019).
2.1.1. Participants
Forty adult participants (mean age 20.7, range 18–31; 23 females and 17 males) were
recruited at the University of Stirling and took part in exchange for either research partic-
ipation tokens required for course completion (35 participants) or £3 in cash (five partici-
pants).
2.2. Results
Statistical analyses (for all the experiments we report here and in the Supporting Infor-
mation) involved generalized linear mixed effects modeling and were carried out using R
(R Core Team, 2013) and lme4 (Bates et al., 2013). Models with binomial dependent
variables used logit link. Models with “maximal” random effects structures (Barr, Levy,
Scheepers, & Tily, 2013) were considered in the first instance, with random slopes, fol-
lowed by random intercept terms removed as necessary to address singular fit or non-con-
vergence issues. p < .05 was taken as statistically significant, and for non-logit-linked
models p values were estimated from the resultant t-statistics, taking an upper bound for
the degrees of freedom as the number of observations minus the number of fixed parame-
ters in the model (Baayen, Davidson, & Bates, 2008).
2.2.1. Selection of scoring tiles
Across all three problems, the mean number of scoring tiles selected by the Demonstra-
tors was 133.6 (SD = 39.33), compared to 278.2 (SD = 48.80) for the Observers. We con-
structed a logit-linked mixed model with whether a selected tile was a scoring tile or not as
(binary) dependent variable, and participant role (Demonstrator vs. Observer; treatment
coded), expedition number (centered), and their interaction as fixed effects. Participant iden-
tity within pair membership, and problem number were included as random intercepts.
Observers selected more scoring tiles than Demonstrators (b = 0.826, SE = 0.045,
z = 18.56, p < .001), and the selection of scoring tiles increased with expedition
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number (b = 0.160, SE = 0.008, z = 19.86, p < .001). The effect of expedition number
was more pronounced for the Demonstrators (b = 0.111, SE = 0.010, z = 11.30,
p < .001).
2.2.2. Redundant selections
We assessed Observer selection of redundant selections by comparing the number of
redundant selections actually made to the number we would have expected if the selec-
tions were made at random. If the Observers selected fewer redundant selections than this
chance level, then this would indicate that they were inferring the location of these redun-
dant selections, and searching the grids in such a way so as to avoid them. The mean (of
individual Demonstrator means) of potential redundant selections was 63 (SD = 9.9;
range 48–84). Note that if the Observer was perfectly able to make and use valid infer-
ences about the Demonstrator’s behavior, they would be able to avoid all potential redun-
dant selections.
To account for Observers selecting the same unrewarded tiles on multiple expeditions
(e.g., due to their not being able to accurately remember their selections from previous
expeditions), we compared the size of the set of redundant selections made at least once
with the number of redundant selections we would expect if the number of unique unre-
warded Observer selections (not including any unrewarded selections of tiles included in
the social information received from the Demonstrator) were made at random. Selecting
fewer than this chance level would indicate that they were making and using valid infer-
ences about the Demonstrator’s behavior to avoid unrewarded selections already sampled
by the Demonstrator.
For the Observers, the mean (mean of the means of each participant’s performance
over the three problems they encountered) number of unique redundant selections was
78.7 (SD = 8.72), on average 20.0 more than the expected chance level: 58.7
(SD = 10.07). The difference between the actual unique redundant selections and the
expected chance level is illustrated, alongside the equivalent results for Experiments 2–4,
in Fig. 3.
We constructed a linear mixed model to investigate the number of redundant selections
made by the Observers, comparing them to the number of redundant selections which
would be expected if the unique number of Observer selections were made randomly.
The fixed effect compared the actual number of redundant selections with the expected
values, treatment coded with the expected values as the baseline. Participant identity was
included as random intercept. The actual number of redundant selections made at least
once by the Observers was more than would have been expected if the number of unique
Observer selections were made randomly (b = 20.001, SE = 2.980, t119 = 6.712,
p < .001).
To investigate the role of expedition number, we constructed an additional model with
selection of a redundant selection as (binary) dependent variable, expedition number (cen-
tered) as fixed effect, and participant identity as random intercept. Selections of redundant
selections reduced with expedition number (b = 0.025, SE = 0.006, z = 4.154,
p < .001).
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2.3. Discussion
As expected, both Demonstrators and Observers selected more scoring tiles in later
expeditions for each problem, indicating that they were using their own past experience
of the problem when making their selections (i.e., by remembering where they had
searched before and remembering which of their previous selections were hits and/or
which of their previous selections were misses). Observers selected more scoring tiles
than Demonstrators, indicating that Observers were making use of the social information
Fig. 3. Difference between actual and chance unique redundant selections for Experiments 1–3, and between
actual and chance mutually redundant selections for Experiment 4. Each point represents Actual–Expected
number of selections for each problem, each Observer participant providing the data for three points. Lower
Actual–Expected indicates that redundant (Experiments 1–3) or mutually redundant (Experiment 4) selections
were avoided to a greater extent than would have been expected if the participants made the same number of
unique selections randomly. In Experiments 1 and 3, there were a greater number of redundant selections
than the chance level. In Experiment 2, there were fewer redundant selections than the chance level. In
Experiment 4, there was no difference.
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available to them (i.e., by selecting the tiles they were informed were hits and/or avoiding
the tiles they were informed were misses).
Contrary to what might be expected, however, Observers made more redundant selec-
tions than would have been expected if they made the same number of unique unre-
warded selections at random. There is therefore no evidence here that the Observers were
able to successfully make and use valid inferences about the Demonstrators’ past experi-
ences. Instead, there was a significant overlap in the unrewarded tiles selected by the
Demonstrators and Observers, with a wide range in the number of times individual grid
locations were searched in the experiment overall. The most commonly searched loca-
tions were searched over three times as often as the least commonly searched locations.
See Supporting Information Section 3 for illustrative histogram and heat maps. Regard-
less of role, the participants would appear to have had a bias toward selecting some tiles
more than others. We return to the effect of participants having such shared “egocentric”
biases, and how they may hinder making and using inferences about others’ behavior, in
Section 6.
In repeating rewarded behavior directly observed, the Observer behavior observed here
is consistent with that likely to preserve cumulative benefits of behaviors arising from
repeated cultural transmission. And as the Observers did not select only redundant selec-
tions among the tiles they did not explicitly receive information about, this behavior
could still result in individual exploration leading to novel, beneficial, modifications to
observed behavior. However, in failing to infer Demonstrator behavior and by selecting a
greater number of redundant selections than we would expect by chance, this behavior
would be more likely to result in a performance plateau than if they managed to infer
previous behaviors from partial information.
When speculating why we did not see any evidence of the Observer inference here, it
is important to consider how there would have been two (broadly) separate steps involved
if our Observers had made and used valid inferences about another’s behavior. One possi-
bility therefore is that the Observers may not have been able to make any valid inferences
about Demonstrator behavior, whether they attempted to or not. A second possibility is
that Observers could have made valid inferences about Demonstrator behavior, but did
not, or that they did make such inferences, but then did not use them. Explanations for a
lack of evidence of inference here may involve either aspects of the Demonstrator behav-
ior, or aspects of the Observer behavior, or both.
The Observers may not have made and used valid inferences about the Demonstrator
behavior here due to the social information they received not allowing easy enough
and/or accurate enough inference of another’s behavior. This may have been due to
there being too little information transmitted, and that an increased amount of social
information received by the Observers would have led to greater avoidance of redun-
dant selections. Alternatively, or additionally, the behavior of the Demonstrators may
have been such that there was minimal transparent structural information available for
the Observers to detect. One possibility is that the Demonstrators searched the grids in
structured yet highly idiosyncratic ways. This may have led to structural regularities
existing, but their only being sufficiently transparent to the Demonstrators themselves,
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with the Observers being unable to detect them. The overlap between Demonstrator and
Observer selections, however, would suggest this is unlikely. Instead, though the
Demonstrators appeared to have had a tendency toward selecting some tiles more than
others in general, they were otherwise making their selections in a fairly unstructured,
that is, pseudo-random, way. The mean proportion of Demonstrator unrewarded selec-
tions after the first expedition were tiles that they had already selected and found to be
non-scoring on at least one previous expedition was 23% (SD = 5.9%). This suggests
that though the Demonstrators were reselecting previously discovered rewarded tiles (as
indicated by selection of scoring tiles increasing with expedition number), they were
not optimally tracking the tiles they had previously found to be unrewarded. If this is
the case, the inferential step would have been particularly challenging for the Obser-
vers. Exploratory analysis of the proportion of these Demonstrator reselections of unre-
warded tiles also found no evidence of an effect of problem number (see Supporting
Information Section 2.1). There was therefore no suggestion that Demonstrator task
experience led to more structured search strategies, and so no evidence that the later
problems could have been less challenging for the Observers to infer Demonstrator
behavior.
Other explanations relate more specifically to the Observers, and their egocentric
biases and motivations involved in the task. Given that the primary goal for the partici-
pants was maximizing their score, the Observers may not have devoted much effort to
inferring previous behavior from partial information, even though being successful at
this could have led to their increasing their scores further. This could have been due to
the perceived benefits of carrying out the inference being outweighed by the perceived
costs of doing so, some assessment of the difficulty of inferring the Demonstrator
behavior from the available information, or the participants simply not considering it at
all. Alternatively, or additionally, the Observers may not have made use of any valid
inferences due to this entailing Observers deviating from behavior they may otherwise
have preferred. As seen by the overlap between Demonstrator and Observer selections,
and the tendency for tiles in some positions to be selected more often than others in
general, if Demonstrator behavior was correctly inferred, making the most use of those
inferences would likely have involved the Observer deviating from their own preferred
selections. They may have been unable, or unwilling, to do this. And as indicated by
redundant selections decreasing with expedition number, some tiles explored by the
Demonstrators were also particularly likely to be explored first by the Observers. This
prioritization of particular tiles suggests making and using inferences of Demonstrator
behavior may have been especially unlikely at the start of an Observer’s search. Addi-
tional exploratory analysis into redundant tile selection found no effect of problem
number (see Supporting Information Section 2.2), and so there is no suggestion that
Observers (not) making and using inferences about Demonstrator behavior was affected
by task experience.
In Experiment 2, we investigated whether participants would make and use valid infer-
ences about another’s behavior in a context in which we believed it would be easier for
them to do so.
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3. Experiment 2: Exposure to more extensive partial information
As in Experiment 1, we assessed the ability for Observers to make and use inferences
about others’ past experience of a problem from exposure to partial information about
their behavior. To investigate a context in which inferring another’s behavior would
likely be easier and of greater benefit, this follow-up study departed from Experiment 1
in two main ways. First, we increased the amount of Demonstrator information available
to the Observer, providing the information from the last three expeditions as opposed to
just the last one. This gave the Observer both information about a greater number of
Demonstrator selections overall from which to infer search behavior, and also between-
expedition dynamic information which we expected would make it easier for the Obser-
ver to infer the trajectory of the Demonstrator’s search strategy. Second, we introduced a
penalty (for both Demonstrators and Observers) for when a participant selected an unre-
warded tile which they had already selected (and found to be unrewarded) on a previous
expedition. As discussed above, the Demonstrators of Experiment 1 did not appear to
have been keeping track of previously discovered unrewarded selections optimally. With
little penalty for reselecting non-scoring tiles, they may have been exploring the grid in a
fairly unstructured, that is, pseudo-random, way. By adding a reselection penalty for unre-
warded tiles here, we expected the Demonstrators to search the grid in a more transpar-
ently structured way, due to a motivation to better track their unrewarded selections from
previous expeditions. Including such a reselection penalty may better reflect many more
naturalistic contexts, where there would likely be substantial costs (in time and energy,
for example) to an individual in repeating behaviors they had already produced and found
not to be beneficial.
We made two key predictions. First, we predicted that Observers would outperform
Demonstrators, that is, that the presence of some social information from the Demonstra-
tor would enable the Observer to select a greater number of hits. Second, we predicted
that Observers, when exposed to only partial information about Demonstrator behavior,
would demonstrate that they had been able to make and use valid inferences about the
Demonstrator behavior which they were not directly exposed to. We predicted that they
would make fewer selections already made and found to be unrewarded (i.e., “misses”)
by the Demonstrator than would be expected if the Observer were making their selections
randomly.
This experiment was registered with the Open Science Framework prior to data collec-
tion: https://osf.io/jquz8.
3.1. Methods
The methodology for Experiment 2 followed that of Experiment 1, but with the follow-
ing changes.
First, we increased the amount of Demonstrator information observed by the Obser-
ver, giving them full information about the selections that were made by the Demon-
strator on the Demonstrator’s final three expeditions for each problem (as opposed to
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the final one expedition in Experiment 1). This not only increased the amount of infor-
mation the Observers received overall but also provided between-expedition procedural
information about Demonstrator searches. Before the Observer’s first expedition for
each problem, they were shown each of the Demonstrator’s 8th, 9th, and 10th expedi-
tion’s selections. To highlight first that there were seven expeditions for which the
Observer received no information, they were shown seven screens with the message
“Search number 1 is hidden from you,” and so on. For each of the Demonstrator’s 8th,
9th, and 10th expeditions, the Observer was shown the Demonstrator selections one
after another in the order in which they were selected. Each of the Demonstrator’s
selections was marked on the grid, with scoring tiles marked with the outline of a
green hexagon, and non-scoring tiles marked with the outline of a red circle. This same
information about the Demonstrator’s selections (including which of the last three of
the Demonstrator’s expeditions they were from, as indicated by the opacity of the shape
outlines, but excluding the information about the order in which they were selected
within each expedition) was displayed on the grid for all 10 of the Observer’s expedi-
tions for that particular problem.
Second, to increase the likelihood that the Demonstrator would search the grid in a
transparently structured way and so increase the likelihood that the Observer would have
been able to make inferences about the Demonstrator’s search history over and above the
partial information they received, we introduced a penalty for when one of the 380 non-
scoring tiles was selected which had already been selected by the participant in a previ-
ous expedition. Rather than 1 point for hit and 0 points for a miss, as in Experiment 1,
there were 10 points for a hit, 0 points for the first time a non-scoring selection is made,
and 1 point for subsequent selections of a non-scoring tile.
Finally, to highlight that the allocation of the scoring tiles was made randomly, the
participant was shown the scoring tiles—those indicated by a green hexagon—being
“shuffled”: They were shown 50 random allocations of 20 scoring tiles in succession over
16 s, with the speed of transition between these presentations and the transparency of the
green hexagons increasing until they were no longer visible.
See Supporting Information Section 6 for screenshots of the experiment as viewed by
the Demonstrator and Observer (Supporting Information Fig. S6) and an illustration of
the relation Demonstrator and Observer for a given pair of participants (Supporting Infor-
mation Fig. S7).
As in Experiment 1, we assessed the selection of scoring tiles for all participants
(both Demonstrators and Observers), and the selection of redundant selections by the
Observers. For the first analysis, note from our preregistrations for Experiments 2–4,
we originally planned to assess participant score rather than selection of scoring tiles
(recall selection of a scoring tile increases score by 10 points, but that score can also
decrease with the repeated selection of unrewarded tiles). To focus solely on partici-
pant selections of rewarded tiles, and for ease of comparison with the score analyses
of Experiment 1, we present the results using selection of scoring tiles here. Alterna-
tive analyses based on score, however, give the same pattern of results throughout
Experiments 2–4.
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3.1.1. Participants
Forty adult participants (mean age 22.2, range 17–45; 36 females and four males) were
recruited at the University of Stirling and took part in exchange for either research participa-
tion tokens required for course completion (31 participants) or £4 in cash (nine participants).
3.2. Results
3.2.1. Selection of scoring tiles
The mean number of scoring tiles selected by the Demonstrators was 126.1
(SD = 47.82); for the Observers, it was 303.5 (SD = 76.96). The mean total scores were
1181.3 (SD = 471.10) for the Demonstrators and 2945.4 (SD = 774.28) for the Obser-
vers.
We constructed a logit-linked mixed model with whether a selected tile was a scoring
tile or not as (binary) dependent variable, and participant role (treatment coded), expedi-
tion number (centered), and their interaction as fixed effects. Participant identity nested
within pair membership and problem number were included as random intercepts.
Observers selected more scoring tiles than Demonstrators (b = 1.000, SE = 0.075,
z = 13.429, p < .001), and the selection of scoring tiles increased with expedition number
(b = 0.157, SE = 0.008, z = 19.006, p < .001). The effect of expedition number was
more pronounced for the Demonstrators (b = 0.098, SE = 0.010, z = 9.834,
p < .001).
Comparing scoring tile selections of Experiments 1 and 2, we also find a greater effect
of role (Observers selecting more scoring tiles than Demonstrators) in Experiment 2 com-
pared to Experiment 1. See Supporting Information Section 7 for details.
3.2.2. Redundant selections
The mean (of individual Demonstrator means) of potential redundant selections was
118 (SD = 11.0; range 90–137). As for Experiment 1, note that if the Observer was per-
fectly able to make and use valid inferences about the Demonstrator’s behavior, they
would be able to avoid all potential redundant selections.
For the Observers, the mean (mean over participants of the mean of each participant’s
performance over the three problems they encountered) number of redundant selections
made at least once was 51.6 (SD = 16.32), on average 7.1 less than would have been
expected if the number of unique Observer selections was assigned randomly: 58.7
(SD = 6.92). The comparison of actual redundant selections made at least once compared
to the expected value if they were assigned randomly is illustrated in Fig. 3.
We constructed a linear mixed model to investigate the number of redundant selections
made by the Observers, comparing them to the number of redundant selections which
would be expected if the unique number of Observer selections was made randomly. The
fixed effect compared the actual number of redundant selections with the expected values,
treatment coded with the expected values as the baseline. Problem number and participant
identity nested within pair membership were included as random intercepts.
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The actual number of redundant selections made at least once by the Observers was
less than would have been expected if the number of unique Observer selections was
made randomly (b = 7.029, SE = 3.459, t119 = 2.032, p = .044).
To investigate the role of expedition number, we constructed an additional model with
selection of a redundant selection as (binary) dependent variable, expedition number (cen-
tered) as fixed effect, and participant identity as random intercept.
Selections of redundant selections reduced with expedition number (b = 0.031,
SE = 0.006, z = 4.843, p < .001).
3.3. Discussion
As predicted, and consistent with the results of Experiment 1, Demonstrators and
Observers scored higher in later expeditions for each problem, indicating that they were
using their own past experience of a problem when making their selections. Observers
also selected more scoring tiles than Demonstrators, indicating again that the Observers
were making use of the observed social information. In line with our predictions, and in
contrast to the results of Experiment 1, Observer participants made fewer redundant
selections than would have been expected if they made the same number of unique selec-
tions at random.
These results suggest that the Demonstrators did develop non-random search strategies,
and that the Observers were able to make and use valid inferences about those search
strategies from partial information in this context. In this experiment, therefore, we see
Observer behavior which would not only likely preserve the cumulative benefits of
repeated cultural transmission in a more naturalistic setting (as in Experiment 1) but
which would also provide some protection against performance plateaus.
Comparing these results with those of Experiment 1, it would appear that it is possi-
ble for inference to play a role in the adaptation of cultural traits, but it may only do so
when the providers of social information behave sufficiently non-randomly, and the
quantity of information transmitted contains enough information about the structural reg-
ularities of their behavior. There may also have been some effect of the random alloca-
tion of rewarded tiles being stressed in Experiment 2: Attempted identification of
structural regularities in another’s search behavior may be more likely if an Observer is
more convinced that there are no structural regularities in the reward positions to
discover.
However, as evident from Fig. 3, many participants in the Observer role did not man-
age to make and use valid inferences about the Demonstrators’ past experiences. The
mean effect size—Observers on average making seven redundant selections less than
would have been expected by chance for each problem—can also be considered small,
given that there was the potential within our experimental design for the Observers to
avoid all potential redundant selections. As noted above, the mean (of individual
Demonstrator means) of potential redundant selections was 118, all of which could have
been avoided if the Observers had perfectly made and used valid inferences about
Demonstrator behavior.
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As discussed in Experiment 1, there may have been a greater role for inference if
the social information allowed easier and/or more accurate inference of another’s
behavior. Again, participants in general were much more likely to search some grid
locations over others (see Supporting Information Section 5 for illustrative histogram
and heat maps). The Demonstrators also suboptimally kept track of their unrewarded
selections. The mean proportion of Demonstrator miss selections after the first expedi-
tion which were tiles that they had already selected (and found to be non-scoring on
at least one previous expedition) was 15% (SD = 7.0%); this was significantly less
than the 23% in Experiment 1, however (see Supporting Information Section 8). Even
if the Observers were attempting to infer Demonstrator behavior, they likely still had
to contend with an egocentric preference for the selection of some tiles over others,
and there may have been few transparent structural regularities to detect in any case.
And as for Experiment 1, exploratory analyses found no evidence either of Demonstra-
tor task experience leading to more structured search strategies (see Supporting Infor-
mation Section 4.1), or of Observer task experience affecting the extent to which they
made and used inferences about Demonstrator behavior (see Supporting Information
Section 4.2).
In two further experiments, we investigated whether in other contexts—specifically
those in which there was even greater potential for the behavior of others to be inferred
from partial information, due to their having behaved in more predictable or more trans-
parent ways—inference played a greater role in the modification of observed behavior
and the adaptation of cultural traits.
4. Experiment 3: Variable exploration costs
We adapted Experiment 2 to assess the effect of there being potentially additional,
transparent cues about the Demonstrator’s behavior, to investigate whether the Obser-
ver would exploit those cues to make and use valid inferences about the Demonstra-
tor’s past experience of the task. Specifically, we introduced variability into the cost
of selecting unrewarded tiles. This cost was known to the participants in advance of
making their selections, and we anticipated that the Demonstrators would search tiles
with lower potential costs before those with higher potential costs, akin to, for exam-
ple, searching for resources in more accessible locations before less accessible ones. If
they did behave in this way, then the Demonstrator behavior would be particularly
predictable (certainly relative to the Demonstrator behavior in Experiments 1 and 2).
If the Observers inferred this behavior and used the inferences, we would expect them
not to search the tile with lower potential costs themselves but instead to pick up
where the Demonstrators had left off and continue searching tiles with increasing
potential costs.
This experiment was registered with the Open Science Framework prior to data col-
lection: https://osf.io/853kv/. The data were collected at the same time as that for
Experiment 4.
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4.1. Methods
The methodology for Experiment 3 followed that of Experiment 2, but with the follow-
ing changes.
Participants again completed three different search problems, with each problem con-
sisting of a grid of 20 9 20 tiles. However, rather than all the tiles for a given problem
being the same color, the tiles were equally and randomly allocated one of five colors
(bright yellow, dull yellow, black, dull blue, and bright blue) so that there are 80 tiles of
each color. Once allocated, these tile colors remained fixed for the duration of a problem.
A randomly allocated 20 of the 400 tiles were scoring tiles (i.e., hits), and selecting those
added 10 points to the participant’s score without decreasing the number of “search cred-
its” (cf. “search attempts” in Experiments 1 and 2) remaining. The other 380 tiles were
non-scoring (misses), and selecting those did not increase the task score (although they
may have decreased it—see below), but used up the number of search credits as deter-
mined by the color of the tile as follows: bright yellow, 1 search credit; dull yellow, 2;
black, 3; dull blue, 4; bright blue, 5. Note that we refer to potential tile costs as the num-
ber of search credits only reduced following unrewarded selections. Participants (whether
Demonstrators or Observers) had 10 opportunities to search each problem and to earn as
high a score as they could within these 10 expeditions. Participants could keep making
selections in any given expedition until they have reached (or, by selecting a non-scoring
tile with a potential cost greater than the number of search credits remaining, exceeded)
their limit of 30 search credits or found all 20 hits. The number of search credits remain-
ing within the current expedition was shown on screen, along with the cumulative score
for the entire experiment. Once selected, a tile could not be selected again within the
same expedition. When selected, scoring tiles were (as in Experiments 1 and 2) marked
with a green hexagon, while selected non-scoring tiles were marked with a red circle.
Once selected, a tile could not be selected again within the same expedition.
The motivation for having tiles of different costs, as indicated by their colors, was to
increase the likelihood that the Demonstrator would search the grid in a transparently
structured way and so increase the likelihood that the Observer would be able to make
inferences about the Demonstrator’s search history over and above the partial information
they received. In Experiment 2, the unrewarded selections always used (the equivalent of)
1 search credit; here, the unrewarded selections use either 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 search credits
(see above). To compensate for the increased costs of selecting the tiles, we increased the
number of search credits available from 20 per expedition to 30 (broadly equivalent to
the 20 search attempts of Experiment 2). Finally, unlike in Experiment 2 where the tran-
sitions between problems were made more salient due to different colored grids (all tiles
were either white, gray, or black for each problem), here the appearance of the grids dif-
fered from problem to problem due to the different allocations of the tile colors.
See Fig. 4 for an example of how the task would appear to a Demonstrator midway
through an expedition.
As for Experiment 2, we analyzed scoring tile selections and redundant selections. We
made the same predictions, that is, that participants (both Demonstrators and Observers)
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would select more scoring tiles in later expeditions, that Observers would select more
scoring tiles than Demonstrators, and that Observers would make fewer Demonstrator-
only redundant selections than would have been expected if they were making the same
number of unique selections randomly.
4.1.1. Participants
Forty adult participants (mean age 22.4, range 18–49; 27 females and 13 males) were
recruited at the University of Stirling and took part in exchange for either research participa-
tion tokens required for course completion (32 participants) or £4 in cash (8 participants).
4.2. Results
4.2.1. Selection of scoring tiles
The mean number of scoring tiles selected by the Demonstrators was 93.3 (SD = 53.73),
compared to 177.1 (SD = 72.23) for the Observers. The mean total scores were 871.0
(SD = 536.64) for the Demonstrators and 1708.7 (SD = 726.92) for the Observers.
We constructed a logit-linked mixed model with whether a selected tile was a scoring
tile or not as (binary) dependent variable, and participant role (treatment coded), expedi-
tion number (centered), and their interaction as fixed effects. Participant identity nested
within pair membership and problem number were included as random intercepts.
Observers selected more scoring tiles than Demonstrators (b = 0.953, SE = 0.166,
z = 5.741, p < .001), and the selection of scoring tiles increased with expedition number
Fig. 4. Example screenshot from Experiment 3. Here, a Demonstrator is midway through an expedition. As
indicated at the top left, the participant has eight search credits (“lives”) remaining. On the left of the screen
are the potential search credit costs of selecting a tile of a given color. If, for example, the participant
selected a black tile, they would use up three search credits if it was a miss (and lose 1 point from their score
if they had already selected that tile in an earlier expedition for that problem). If it was a hit, however, they
did not use up any search credits and gained 10 points. The behavior illustrated here, of primarily searching
the “lower cost” tiles, was typical of our Demonstrator participants in earlier expeditions, as intended.
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(b = 0.200, SE = 0.010, z = 20.796, p < .001). The effect of expedition number was more
pronounced for the Demonstrators (b = 0.095, SE = 0.012, z = 7.845, p < .001).
4.2.2. Redundant selections
The mean (of individual Demonstrator means) of potential redundant selections was 92
(SD = 20.7; range 63–132). As for Experiments 1 and 2, note that if the Observer was
perfectly able to make and use valid inferences about the Demonstrator’s behavior, they
would be able to avoid all potential redundant selections.
For the Observers, the mean (mean over participants of the mean of each participant’s
performance over the three problems they encountered) number of redundant selections
made at least once was 41.9 (SD = 26.41), on average 13.5 more than would have been
expected if the number of unique Observer selections were assigned randomly: 28.4
(SD = 11.33). The comparison of actual redundant selections made at least compared to
the expected value if they were assigned randomly is illustrated in Fig. 3.
We constructed a linear mixed model to investigate the number of redundant selections
made by the Observers, comparing them to the number of redundant selections which
would be expected if the unique number of Observer selections were made randomly.
The fixed effect compared the actual number of redundant selections with the expected
values, treatment coded with the expected values as the baseline. Problem number and
pair membership were included as random intercepts. The actual number of redundant
selections made at least once by the Observers was more than would have been expected
if the number of unique Observer selections were made randomly (b = 13.497,
SE = 2.775, t119 = 4.864, p < .001).
To investigate the role of expedition number, we constructed an additional model with
selection of a redundant selection as (binary) dependent variable, expedition number (cen-
tered) as fixed effect, and participant identity and problem number as random intercepts.
Selections of redundant selections reduced with expedition number (b = 0.178,
SE = 0.008, z = 12.247, p < .001).
4.3. Discussion
As predicted, and consistent with the results of Experiments 1 and 2, both Demonstra-
tors and Observers scored higher in later expeditions for each problem, indicating that
they were using their own past experience of the problem when making their selections.
Observers also selected more scoring tiles than Demonstrators, indicating that Observers
were making use of the social information available.
Contra our predictions and the results of Experiment 2, Observer participants made more
redundant selections than would have been expected if they made the same number of unique
selections at random. Though the Demonstrators’ selected tiles with lower potential cost
before those with higher potential cost as we anticipated, the Observers did the same, also
starting with the tiles with the lowest potential costs. See Fig. 5 for illustrative figures. So, typ-
ically, the Demonstrator searched the tiles with lower costs first, and the social information
transmitted indicated that they were only selecting unrewarded tiles with higher costs in their
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final three expeditions. This would allow the Observer to infer that the rewarded tiles colored
as having lower potential costs were likely all discovered and included within the social infor-
mation available to them. However, the Observer still began by searching the tiles with the
lowest potential costs first. Exploratory analyses also indicated that this pattern of behavior in-
creased with task experience: Demonstrators search strategies appeared to become more struc-
tured (as indicated by reselections of previously selected unrewarded tiles reducing with
problem number; Supporting Information Section 9.1), yet Observers increasingly made
redundant selections (Supporting Information Section 9.2).
The potential for making and using inferences about the behavior of others here did not
lead to participants in receipt of partial information about that behavior to do so. The Obser-
vers could have inferred that the Demonstrator’s behavior was likely similar to their own, ego-
centric, preferred strategy (i.e., searching tiles with lower potential costs first), and made use
of this by deviating from this strategy. Instead, aside from selecting the rewarded tiles they
observed as social information, they broadly replicated the behavior of the Demonstrator.
5. Experiment 4: Interaction
In our final experiment, we investigated the role of inferring behavior from partial infor-
mation about another individual’s experience in a context involving bidirectional interaction
Fig. 5. Proportion of unrewarded selections by cost and expedition for the Demonstrators (left) and Obser-
vers (right). Colors shown are those used in the experiment (see Fig. 4). As evident by the greater proportions
of lower cost selections in earlier expeditions for both the Demonstrators and Observers, the Observers do
not appear to have inferred that the Demonstrators would typically have already discovered rewarded tiles
colored as having lower potential costs (note that as the Demonstrators were reselecting the rewarded tiles
discovered on earlier expeditions, the rewarded tiles colored as having lower potential costs would be
included in the social information available to the Observers). If they had, then we would expect the early
Observer expeditions to pick up from where the late Demonstrator expeditions left off, that is, by having
increasingly smaller proportions of tiles with lower costs and increasingly larger proportions of tiles with
higher costs.
M. Atkinsona, K. H. Blakeya, C. A. Caldwell / Cognitive Science 44 (2020) 23 of 33
between individuals. We again recruited pairs of participants. But rather than one partici-
pant only taking the role of Demonstrator and the other only the role of Observer as in
Experiments 1–3, the participants worked as a collaborative dyad aiming to maximize their
combined score, guided by partial information about their partner’s behavior.
Interaction and coordination have been shown to lead to successful task outcomes in a
variety of contexts, particularly those in which the primary goal of participants directly
involves some form of coordination. In these “coordination tasks,” the optimal or target
behavior of an individual is dependent on the behavior of another individual or individu-
als, such as tasks where the primary goal involves successful communication with other
participants (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Garrod, Fay, Lee, Oberlander, &
Macleod, 2007; Kirby, Tamariz, Cornish, & Smith, 2015). These coordination tasks can
be contrasted with the “search tasks” we have discussed so far, where the optimal behav-
ior of an individual (such as selecting all the rewarded tiles in a grid) is unaffected by
the actions of any other individual.
Interacting pairs in coordination tasks are demonstrably able to, for example, establish
linguistic conventions (e.g., Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Garrod & Doherty, 1994) and
develop novel communication systems (e.g., Fay, Arbib, & Garrod, 2013; Fay, Garrod, &
Roberts, 2008; Galantucci, 2005; Selten & Warglien, 2007) in a range of different con-
texts. And interaction, in particular having numerous opportunities to observe the behav-
ior of another, including observing how one’s own behavior is responded to, leads to
more transparent, predictable behavior which is more likely to be correctly interpreted by
those involved in the interaction (e.g., Atkinson, Smith, & Kirby, 2018; Feher, Wonna-
cott, & Smith, 2016; Schober & Clark, 1989).
Here, we investigated whether a context which included interaction would lead to a greater
role for inferring the behavior of others in a search task. With interaction, pairs of participants
might coordinate their search strategies to more successfully infer one another’s behavior and
so avoid making the same unrewarded selections. Compared to Experiments 1–3, we expected
individual participants to deviate from the search strategies they might have preferred if they
were taking part in the task by themselves, with an increased pressure to search the grids in
not only a systematic way to allow them to remember their searches of earlier expeditions but
also in a way which made the systematicity transparent for their partner.
This experiment was registered with the Open Science Framework prior to data collec-
tion: https://osf.io/kry8g/.
5.1. Methods
The methodology for Experiment 4 followed that of Experiment 2 but with the follow-
ing changes.
Rather than having two participants who each searched each grid 10 times consecu-
tively, the participants only searched each grid 10 times as a pair, swapping roles after
every two expeditions. At the role swap, the individual participant whose turn it was to
next attempt the task was told how many points their partner had added to their combined
score over the last two expeditions. They then completed two expeditions themselves,
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having received information about the second of their partner’s two most recent expedi-
tions, that is, the expedition immediately preceding the role swap. As in Experiments 1–
3, the received information included the order in which the selections were made, and the
selections were visible on screen throughout the two expeditions, again marked by the
outlines of green hexagons and red circle to indicate which selections would be rewarded
and unrewarded.
As the participants here were not confined to either a Demonstrator or an Observer role
throughout, we could not analyze redundant selections as a measure of inferring behavior
here. We instead defined “mutually redundant” selections to capture selections which are
redundant only from the perspective of the selections made by the participants within the
dyad as a whole, that is, non-scoring tiles that were selected at least once by both partici-
pants over the 10 searches for each problem, but for which neither received direct infor-
mation that their partner had made the same selection.
We predicted that the selection of scoring tiles would increase with expedition number, and
that there would be fewer mutually redundant selections than would have been expected if the
number of unique non-scoring selections made by each participant were made randomly.
5.1.1. Participants
Forty adult participants (mean age 24.7, range 18–49; 26 females, 13 males, and one
participant who elected to not provide gender information) were recruited at the Univer-
sity of Stirling and took part in exchange for either research participation tokens required
for course completion (16 participants) or £4 in cash (24 participants).
5.2. Results
5.2.1. Selection of scoring tiles
The mean dyad total score was 1016.7 (SD = 383.76), with dyads selecting a mean of
106.8 (SD = 38.73) scoring tiles.
To assess the effect of expedition number on the selection of scoring tiles, we constructed
a logit-linked mixed model with whether a selected tile was a scoring tile or not as (binary)
dependent variable and expedition number (centered) as fixed effect. Participant identity
nested within pair membership and problem number were included as random intercepts.
The number of scoring tile selections increased with expedition number (b = 0.150,
SE = 0.009, z = 16.81, p < .001).
5.2.2. Mutually redundant selections
The mean (mean over dyads of the mean of each dyad’s performance over the three
problems they encountered) number of mutually redundant selections was 6.5
(SD = 2.62). The expected number of mutually redundant selections if the number of
unique unrewarded selections were made randomly was 7.1 (SD = 1.32). The comparison
of actual mutually redundant selections compared to the expected value if they were
assigned randomly is illustrated in Fig. 3.
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We constructed a linear model to investigate the number of mutually redundant selec-
tions, comparing them to the number of mutually redundant selections which would be
expected if the unique number of selections were made randomly. Note that the random
intercepts of dyad identity and problem number specified in our preregistration were
dropped to prevent a singular fit.
There was no evidence of a difference between the actual number of mutually redun-
dant selections and that expected if the number of unique unrewarded selections were
made randomly (b = 0.578, SE = 0.587, t118 = 0.984, p = .327).
5.3. Discussion
As predicted, the selection of scoring tiles increased with expedition number, indicat-
ing that the participants used their own personal experience of the problem and/or the
information they received about their partner’s experience to increase their success at the
task. Contra our predictions, however, there was no evidence of a difference between the
number of mutually redundant selections and that expected if the number of unique unre-
warded selections were made randomly. Exploratory analysis also found no evidence of
mutually redundant selections decreasing with problem number (see Supporting Informa-
tion Section 10), and so no evidence of inference developing with task experience. There
is therefore no evidence that the participants made and used valid inferences of their part-
ner’s experience of the task, and so no support for a context involving interaction having
a role for inferring the behavior of another from partial information.
It is possible of course that inferring the behavior of another from partial information
would play a role in a different search task context which involved interaction. It is also
possible that coordination of search strategies within dyads (where the partial information
is transmitted horizontally) would increase with repeated cultural transmission to subse-
quent “generations” of dyads, that is, where the (partial) behavior of one dyad is (verti-
cally) transmitted to another dyad. In (coordination task) studies where the primary goal
for participants has been successful communication, for example, structure in participant
behavior increases with cultural transmission to naive participants (e.g., Carr, Smith, Cor-
nish, & Kirby, 2016; Kirby et al., 2015; Silvey, Kirby, & Smith, 2019). If repeated cross-
generational transmission leads to increasingly regular, and so potentially increasingly
transparent, behavior within dyads, then making and using valid inferences of another
individual may become easier, and so possibly more prevalent, in a search task such as
ours. However, given the limited evidence for a role of inferring the behavior of others
across Experiments 1–4, we do not predict that this would be the case.
6. General discussion
In all four contexts we explored here, participants successfully used both the social informa-
tion available to them and their own experience of the task. There was also consistent evidence
for individual exploration: Participants did not simply replicate observed or previously
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produced behaviors, but modified them in ways which had the potential to improve perfor-
mance further. Such behavior is consistent with that which would lead to increased benefits to
users with repeated cultural transmission, allowing them to exploit behaviors which they would
only likely be able to discover through the cumulative exploration of others.
However, we saw only limited evidence (Experiment 2), if any (Experiments 1, 3, and
4), of participants making and using valid inferences about another person’s experience
of the task when modifying the behavior they directly observed, despite the potential task
benefits of making and using such inferences. Though novel rewards—those never dis-
covered by the previous participant—could still be discovered (thanks to Observer selec-
tions not being completely restricted to the set of all selections made by the
Demonstrator), the behavior observed here would have only limited protection against
performance plateaus. This behavior is not inconsistent with that which could lead to, for
example, the development of increasingly efficient tools, or incremental progress in an
area of scientific research. It would not be consistent, however, with also inferring unob-
servable historical tool designs, or the unpublished studies carried out by other research-
ers, even where it could advantageous to do so.
So why, given the potential benefits of inferring the behavior of the provider of social
information beyond that observed, did we not see greater evidence of it here? It is possi-
ble that this is due to some peculiarities of our experimental paradigm, or specific ele-
ments in the design of the individual experiments, and that inference does typically play
a more substantial role in the adaptation of cultural traits. Our presentation of the task,
choice of grid size, or the wording of our instructions, for example, may in some way
have discouraged either making inferences and/or using inferred information successfully.
Participants may also have made greater use of inference if it involved inferring sampled
and rejected behaviors from the exploration of multiple participants, either within a single
generation or across multiple generations, rather than the exploration of a single individ-
ual. Alternatively, we may have seen such limited use of inference due to our using ran-
domly structured reward spaces: The Observers may have prioritized inference if they
believed they could not only infer something about their predecessor’s search structure,
but also extract information about some structure in the positioning of the rewards (see
Mackintosh et al., in prep., for an example of a task involving structured reward spaces
within the same experimental paradigm). Our results may also be to some extent unique
to the (type of) population we got our participants from, given evidence that responses to
social information (Mesoudi, Chang, Murray, & Lu, 2015) and perspective taking (Wu &
Keysar, 2007) may be culturally dependent. We may find greater evidence of inference if
we sampled participants from a different population, and we would particularly welcome
an extension of this line of research which included cross-cultural comparison.
Alternatively, and we suggest more likely, there may be key reasons why inference
played a very limited role here, and these may well be applicable to many, or even most,
contexts involving the transmission of cultural traits and social information use.
First, the challenges involved both in inferring the behavior of others and successfully
using those inferences may be particularly great in contexts involving the types of cultural
trait we have considered in these experiments. As discussed above (see Section 5), optimal
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behavior in search tasks is not dependent on the behavior of other individuals as it is in coor-
dination tasks. In coordination tasks, a significant degree of behavioral alignment among
individuals is essential to task success, and there are two implications of this for a possible
role of inference. First, inference is highly likely to be directly and transparently advanta-
geous to task success (though note that effective coordination is possible in the absence of
inference, as discussed in, e.g., Barr, 2014; Sulik & Lupyan, 2018). Second, if another’s
behavior or knowledge is correctly inferred, then the optimal use of the inferences will
likely be to largely replicate and incorporate the information inferred into an individual’s
own behavior. So, for example, if an individual infers the system an interlocutor is using to
map a set of signals to a set of referents, then they can use their knowledge of this system to
both correctly identify referents from signals they receive, and send signals with a high
probability that they will be matched to intended referents. And they do this using the
inferred system of signal-referent mappings in the same way as their interlocutor.
By contrast, in search tasks such as those of the experiments we present here, behavioral
alignment not being essential for task success leads to different implications for the possible
role of inference. First, inferring the behavior of others is not as directly related to task suc-
cess as it is for coordination goal tasks. Though inferring the behavior of others can aid task
success (by providing information about previously sampled and rejected behaviors which
an individual would likely be best off avoiding themselves), the inferential step alone cannot
lead to an individual performing well at the task. And in the case where the social informa-
tion they receive comes from someone who has performed poorly at the task in some way
(e.g., by forgetting the location of previously discovered rewards), then inferring their
behavior may even be detrimental to task success (as avoiding their previously sampled
behaviors may lead to the avoidance of those forgotten rewards). An individual in a search
task is therefore left with multiple challenges if they do attempt to infer the behavior of
another: the primary task itself, and the inferential step. In our experiments, they would have
had to infer which selections another participant had made as well as deciding which selec-
tions to make themselves to maximize their score, all while also keeping track of their own
personal search history. Given the computational challenges of inferring the knowledge and
behavior of others, and the low probability of doing so with a high degree of accuracy in
many situations, the (perceived) benefits of the inferential step may easily be outweighed by
the (perceived) additional costs. And given that the inferential step is optional with regard to
completing the task, individuals may be unlikely to attempt it (see Lieder & Griffiths, 2018,
for a discussion of how cognitive strategy selection is dependent on such benefit to cost
tradeoffs). Furthermore, even if an individual correctly infers the knowledge or behavior of
another, then this will only directly provide information about how not to behave. A tool-
maker, for example, will at best only have inferred which tool designs are less efficient than
that they can observe directly and wish to improve on. In contrast to the use of inferred
information in coordination tasks, the individual is still left with determining which behav-
ior to produce. Making use of inferred information is not as straightforward as simply repli-
cating inferred behavior, for example.
Another reason why there may be a limited role for inference relates to a conflict
between making and using inferences about the behaviors of others, and the individual’s
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own, egocentric, bias for producing a particular, context-dependent, behavior. This conflict
can prevent an individual from making inferences, due to the salience, perceived benefits,
or ease of a behavior they find preferable. And, if individuals (partially) share the same
egocentric biases, not making and using inferences about another’s behavior may lead to
multiple individuals behaving in similar ways even if they do not observe that behavior in
another (as we observed, for example, in Experiments 1 and 3, with the Observers making
a large number of redundant selections). Even if the inference-egocentric bias conflict does
not prevent the individual from making inferences, it may still prevent them from using
them. Take the Observer behavior in Experiment 3 as an illustration. For all participants,
regardless of whether they were assigned to the Demonstrator or Observer role, selecting
tiles with lower potential costs was clearly preferred over selecting those with higher poten-
tial costs (again, see Fig. 5 for illustration). This bias is understandable, given that a partic-
ipant could search a greater number of tiles if they selected more with a lower potential
cost, and this was part of our experimental design to encourage the Demonstrators to
behave in a predictable way (i.e., in accordance with this bias). For the Observers, their
egocentric bias to select the tiles with unknown reward values and low potential costs
therefore appeared to overcome the more optimal strategy of (a) inferring that the Demon-
strator would likely have had the same preference, and so (b) deducing that all the
rewarded tiles colored as having lower potential costs would already be included in the
transmitted social information visible on screen. And this was in spite of the social infor-
mation providing additional cues that the Demonstrator had the same bias as the Observer
and had made their selections accordingly. Future research could focus on determining the
contexts under which inferences about Demonstrator behavior can be made, even if partici-
pants do not typically go on to use those inferences when given the same task as the
Demonstrator. Experiments 1–3 could, for example, be adapted so that the Observers were
given the alternative task of predicting Demonstrator selections from partial information.
Despite these general obstacles to inference being involved in the cultural transmission of
cultural traits, we do not discount there being some contexts where making and using the
inferences of others does play a more substantial role. Even in such cases, however, the chal-
lenges to the making and use of inferred information will remain. Egocentric biases can pre-
vent successfully making and using inferences about the behavior of others in contexts
where doing so would be more directly beneficial to task success (see Sulik & Lupyan,
2018, for an example of how individuals fail to accurately take the perspective of others in a
signaling task). So if, for example, the context was such that an additional goal for the
Demonstrators in Experiments 1 and 2 was to produce behavior from which the Observers
could accurately infer that behavior from partial information, there is no guarantee that it
would increase the likelihood of the Demonstrators doing so (future work could specifically
investigate this). Similarly, even if the task for the Observers of Experiment 3 was to infer
the behavior of the Demonstrators (behavior likely to be highly predictable by design), this
is not to say that they would have done so accurately. The clash of egocentric bias and infer-
ence could be reduced by individuals having markedly different egocentric biases, but their
having these different biases would likely make any inferred previous behavior less useful to
the person who did the inferring, even if the individuals shared the same task goal; an
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individual inferring another’s previously sampled and rejected behaviors would be of limited
use to them if they were unlikely to produce those behaviors themselves anyway.
In evaluating the reasons above, recall that our experimental design made the task of
acquiring and beneficially modifying the behavior of another relatively trivial: There was
nothing restricting the Observer’s access to the social information they were exposed to. The
hits and misses of the Demonstrator’s preceding (Experiments 1 and 4) or three preceding
(Experiments 2 and 3) expeditions remained visible on screen while the Observer was making
their selections. They did not, for example, also have to remember where those socially
observed hits and misses were. Our results therefore suggest that the role of inferring behavior
is limited even in contexts where it would likely be easier to make and use such inferences,
that is, when acquiring comparatively transparent traits which can be studied in detail. But for
traits which are more opaque or transient, an additional load on the Observer’s memory would
likely reduce the role of inferring behavior from partial social information even further. Even
though the mechanism could be particularly useful in the context of more opaque and/or tran-
sient traits, it does not necessarily follow that it is more likely to be employed.
Despite these arguments, it may still be possible that individuals may make and use
inferences about previously sampled and rejected behaviors in some contexts (not neces-
sarily involving cumulative cultural traits) where there is a particularly substantial cost to
an individual producing a behavior which they had not observed, yet which had already
been sampled and rejected by a previous generation. For example, if an individual
believes that some food sources may be poisonous but does not know which, they may
use inference to avoid readily available foods which they do not observe other individuals
eating. Yet even in these cases an individual can avoid maladaptive behavior without
making and using inferences about previous behaviors, thanks to, for example, high-fi-
delity copying and/or social learning strategies which would lead to copying the behavior
produced by the majority of observed individuals.
So what, in suggesting at most a minimal role for this mechanism in the adaptation of
cultural traits, are the implications for cumulative cultural evolution? How do individuals
make specifically beneficial modifications to observed behaviors as they acquire and use
them? As discussed in Section 1, some traits may leave physical records as they are
repeatedly transmitted, and it may be that in some contexts these are actually examined in
some detail before observed traits are modified. On a similar note, in some cases the pay-
offs which will be received from specific modifications may be relatively easier to calcu-
late and predict. This may be particularly the case for more transparent traits. However,
perhaps most importantly, previously sampled and rejected behaviors can be avoided in
cases of cumulative cultural evolution without a need for individuals to infer those behav-
iors thanks to other tools available to humans in the adaptation of cultural traits, such as
language and teaching (see Caldwell, Renner, & Atkinson, 2018; Morgan et al., 2015;
Zwirner & Thornton, 2015, for experimental evidence and discussion regarding the roles
of language and teaching in cumulative cultural evolution). In Experiments 1–3, for exam-
ple, if the Demonstrator were able to communicate with the Observer, they could tell them
which selections they had already made, or described the general process by which they
searched the grid, and the Observer could avoid making redundant selections without
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needing to observe those selections directly. Similarly, in Experiment 4, the participants in
a dyad would be able to agree on a strategy for searching the grid which would eliminate,
or at least greatly reduce the number of, mutually redundant selections.
7. Conclusion
Over four experiments, we tested the hypothesis that inferring behavior from partial
social information would have a role in the adaptation of cultural traits, by determining
whether individuals would make and use valid inferences of others’ behavior over and
above the social information directly transmitted. In one experiment, we did find evidence
for such a role for inference, but the benefit of participants making and using inferences
about the behavior of others was minimal. In the other three experiments, we found no
evidence to support the hypothesis, even in contexts where the behavior of another was
largely predictable. We suggest that inferring the behavior of others will rarely play a
role in the adaptation of cultural traits due to the costs involved in making and using
valid inferences about the behaviors of others, and due to the existence of other tools
which can facilitate cumulative cultural traits, such as teaching and language.
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